By Kilimokwanza.org 

The agricultural sector, historically positioned as the engine of African economic development and the primary source of livelihood for the majority of the continent’s population, is currently besieged by a systemic crisis of financing. This report presents an exhaustive analysis of the structural, legal, and operational failures that characterize the relationship between African agricultural enterprises—ranging from subsistence smallholders to massive agro-industrial estates—and the financial institutions tasked with funding them.

Through a forensic examination of case law, financial audits, and parliamentary inquiries across South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda, a disturbing pattern emerges. The narrative of the “defaulting farmer” is frequently a reductionist cover for a more complex reality: a banking ecosystem that sets borrowers up for failure through delayed disbursements, partial funding, and usurious interest structures that ignore the biological imperatives of the planting cycle.

This report investigates the “fairness” of the subsequent foreclosure processes. It scrutinizes court cases where banks, having precipitated liquidity crises through contract breaches or bureaucratic incompetence, utilize aggressive receivership and auction mechanisms to seize assets, often at values significantly below market rates. The analysis contrasts the strict “sanctity of contract” upheld by the judiciary against the equitable defenses raised by farmers who argue that the lender’s own conduct rendered repayment impossible.

1. The Structural Pathology of Agricultural Finance: The “Setup to Fail” Mechanism

The core finding of this investigation is that agricultural finance in Africa is often structurally misaligned with the operational realities of farming. Unlike trading or manufacturing, where capital turnover can be rapid and distinct, agriculture is bound by rigid biological windows. A delay in funding is not merely an inconvenience; it is a determinant of crop failure.

1.1 The Chronology of Failure: Delayed Disbursement and Biological Risk

The most pervasive complaint from agricultural borrowers across the continent is the misalignment between loan disbursement schedules and the agricultural calendar. Financial institutions, burdened by bureaucratic approval processes or liquidity constraints, frequently release funds weeks or months after the optimal planting window has closed.

In Kenya, this phenomenon is exemplified by the collapse of Karuturi Limited, once one of the world’s largest cut-flower producers. The enterprise, which operated a massive farm in Naivasha, entered into a financing agreement with ICICI Bank of India. The agreement stipulated a loan facility of US$ 40 million, to be disbursed in tranches to fund expansion and operations.¹ However, court records from the High Court of Kenya reveal that the bank breached this contract by failing to release the full second tranche of US$ 25 million. The directors of Karuturi argued that this “failure to release funds” was the proximate cause of the company’s financial distress. Without the agreed working capital, the farm could not maintain its production cycles, leading to a revenue collapse.¹

The Kenyan High Court, in a ruling by Justice Francis Gikonyo, validated this perspective, noting that the lender’s conduct “stalled the flower firm’s operations and made repayment difficult.” The judge questioned the validity of the receivership, observing that appointing a receiver after crippling the debtor through non-disbursement was “not only against the law but will destroy the enterprise and will benefit no one”.¹ This creates a causal loop: the bank withholds capital to mitigate risk; the withholding of capital causes the very default the bank feared; the bank then moves to foreclose on the assets.

A similar dynamic is evident in Ghana, within the Ghana Broiler Revitalization Program (GHABROP). This initiative, designed to reduce poultry imports, relied on a financing model involving Barclays Bank (now Absa) and government backing. Poultry farmers reported that a GH¢6 million loan facility was marred by severe delays. By the time funds were processed, market conditions and input costs had shifted. Consequently, while the farmers’ debt obligation (principal plus interest) ballooned to GH¢8 million, the actual proceeds realized from the delayed production cycle amounted to only GH¢2 million.² The Vice Chairman of the Poultry Farmers Association of Ghana, Napoleon Agyeman Oduro, described the situation as one where the financing model itself “caused huge discomfort and challenges,” leading to the collapse of the pilot phase rather than its success.²

1.2 Partial Funding: The Liquidity Trap

Beyond delays, there is the critical issue of partial funding—where a bank approves a loan but disburses only a fraction, or funds the acquisition of a capital asset (like land) while refusing to fund the working capital (seeds, fertilizer, labor) required to make the asset productive.

In South Africa, this practice has had devastating consequences for land reform beneficiaries. The state-owned Land and Agricultural Development Bank (Land Bank) has been criticized for setting up emerging black farmers for failure. In the Western Cape, farmers like Kallie Geslin and Charles Pietersen secured loans to purchase wine farms but were denied sufficient operating capital. Geslin testified: “We had to sell our first crop to get operating money, but we did not get enough… caused a lot of infighting… we needed to put the money back into the business”.³

The result of this under-capitalization is a “liquidity trap.” The farmer owns the land but cannot afford the inputs to farm it efficiently. The debt service on the land purchase begins immediately, but the revenue stream is strangled by the lack of working capital. This structural flaw led to the Land Bank repossessing over 350 farms, many from the very demographic the state intended to empower.³ The Director of the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS), Ben Cousins, argued that these farmers were “badly advised by the Land Bank” and given loans that were structurally unsound given the input-output price squeeze.³

1.3 The “Input” Deception and Value Inflation

In Nigeria, the mechanism of failure often involves the mandatory provision of inputs in lieu of cash, a system rife with corruption and value inflation. Under the Central Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) Anchor Borrowers Programme (ABP), meant to boost rice and maize production, loans are disbursed partially in cash and partially in kind (seedlings, fertilizer).

However, investigations and farmer testimonies reveal a pattern of fraud. Farmers in Cross River State alleged that while they were coerced into signing loan agreements for N250,000, they received only N95,000 in cash. The balance was deducted for fertilizer charged at N7,500 per bag—significantly above the market price of N6,000.⁴ By inflating the cost of inputs and delaying their delivery, the Bank of Agriculture (BOA) and its partners effectively reduced the real value of the loan while maintaining the full liability. When the harvest inevitably fell short of the inflated debt obligation, the farmers were labeled as defaulters. This practice of “loading” the loan with overpriced inputs serves to transfer public funds to contractors and officials while leaving the farmer with the debt burden.⁴

Table 1: Comparative Analysis of Disbursement Failures

Jurisdiction	Financial Institution	Nature of Disbursement Failure	Economic Consequence	Legal/Operational Outcome
Kenya	ICICI Bank / Stanbic	Withheld US$ 25M of US$ 40M approved facility.	Farm operation stalled; revenue collapse.	Receivership; piecemeal asset auction.1
Ghana	Barclays / Govt	Delayed release for poultry pilot program.	Production missed peak cycle; interest accumulated.	Debt (GH¢8m) exceeded revenue (GH¢2m) by 400%.2
Nigeria	Bank of Agriculture (BOA)	Inflated input costs; partial cash release (38% of face value).	Farmers under-resourced; input arbitrage by officials.	High default rates; legislative threats of arrest.4
South Africa	Land Bank	Funded land acquisition without adequate working capital.	Liquidity crisis immediately post-purchase.	Repossession of 350+ emerging farmer properties.3
Tanzania	NMB / Agrica	High debt burden for inputs in contract farming.	Farmers unable to service debt due to price controls.	Bankruptcy of Kilombero Plantation; seizure by NMB.6

2. Institutional Pathology: The Governance Crisis in Agricultural Banking

The failure of agricultural financing is not solely a product of market forces; it is deeply rooted in the institutional pathologies of the lenders themselves. State-owned agricultural banks, in particular, are plagued by a duality of purpose—torn between political mandates and banking regulations—while suffering from gross mismanagement and corruption.

2.1 The Regulatory Vacuum and Internal Fraud: The Case of AFC Kenya

The Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) in Kenya operates under a unique statutory framework (the AFC Act) that exempts it from the Banking Act.⁷ While intended to allow flexibility in developmental lending, this exemption has created a governance vacuum where internal controls are flouted with impunity.

A forensic audit by the Auditor General exposed a rot at the heart of the institution:

• Missing Loan Books: 40 loans totaling KSh 35.7 million were entirely missing from the system, yet the funds had been disbursed.⁸
• Insider Lending: Seven AFC directors held loans worth KSh 48.9 million, with five of them in arrears totaling KSh 35.7 million. This insider dealing suggests that the institution’s capital is captured by its own governance structure.⁸
• Fraudulent Collateral: In Kapsabet, KSh 22.6 million was advanced to 13 farmers using fraudulent title deeds. Although the Corporation won court judgments against the fraudsters, the lack of valid security meant no recovery could be made.⁹

This internal chaos compromises the AFC’s ability to act as a rational lender. When it moves to recover debts, it often does so aggressively to cover its own liquidity gaps caused by mismanagement. Farmers like Mr. Ashono have been forced to petition the High Court for protection, arguing that the AFC’s practice of charging compound interest and penalties violates the in duplum rule (which caps interest at the principal amount). Mr. Ashono’s debt escalated to KSh 3.5 million despite him having repaid the principal amount, a situation that would be illegal for a commercial bank but is ambiguous for the AFC due to its specific Act.¹⁰

2.2 The “National Cake” Syndrome and Executive Corruption in Nigeria

In Nigeria, the Bank of Agriculture (BOA) faces a crisis of legitimacy. The concept of the “national cake”—where government funds are viewed as a share of oil wealth rather than repayable loans—pervades the borrower culture. A BOA branch manager in Ilorin lamented that recovery of N243 million was stalled because debtors used funds for “weddings and parties”.¹¹

However, the corruption is bilateral. The House of Representatives Committee on Nutrition and Food Security threatened to issue an arrest warrant for the Managing Director of the BOA due to the bank’s failure to account for N81 billion disbursed under the Anchor Borrowers Programme.¹² Furthermore, in Adamawa State, officials of both the BOA and the CBN were accused of diverting N265.7 million meant for farmers into fixed deposit accounts to harvest interest for personal gain.¹⁴ This diversion not only delayed the funds reaching the farmers but criminalized the farmers’ subsequent inability to farm, as they were waiting for capital that was sitting in the accounts of bank officials.

2.3 The Sustainability Crisis: South Africa’s Land Bank

The Land Bank of South Africa illustrates the tension between transformation and solvency. Having recently emerged from a four-year default on its own debt (reducing liability from R45 billion to R16 billion) ¹⁵, the Bank has been forced to prioritize aggressive debt recovery to satisfy its bondholders.

This prioritization was legally codified in the Constitutional Court judgment of Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform v Land and Agricultural Bank.¹⁶ The case involved a farm (Poplar Grove) purchased with state grant money for land reform beneficiaries but bonded to the Land Bank for additional capital. When the beneficiaries failed, the property was forfeited. The legal battle was over who gets the proceeds: the State (which paid for the land) or the Bank (which held the bond). The Court ruled that the Land Bank’s interest as a secured creditor took precedence. This judgment effectively establishes that the financial sustainability of the state bank trumps the developmental objectives of the state itself, leaving the beneficiaries with nothing.

2.4 Governance Failures in Ghana’s ADB

The Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) in Ghana has similarly struggled with governance issues that impact its lending capacity. Attempts to merge the ADB with the National Investment Bank (NIB) were cancelled by the President to allow for individual recapitalization.¹⁷ However, the bank remains burdened by high non-performing loans (NPLs) and allegations of mismanagement.

The Board of Directors has had to issue public defenses against allegations of “mismanagement and embezzlement,” including the controversial sale of the bank’s head office and the purchase of vehicles by the Chairman.¹⁸ While the Board denied these claims, citing adherence to asset disposal policies, the friction between the staff union (UNICOF) and management highlights a distracted institution. This internal turmoil correlates with a stringent recovery approach against farmers, as seen in the Palm Acres case where the bank pursued a debt of GH¢1.5 million with 33% interest.¹⁹

3. The Commercial Banking Sector: Predatory Interest and The “In Duplum” Battle

Commercial banks engage with the agricultural sector primarily through the lens of risk-adjusted returns. This results in high interest rates and rigorous enforcement of security. A central theme in litigation against commercial banks is the dispute over interest calculation and the in duplum rule.

3.1 The In Duplum Rule: A Shield Pierced

The in duplum rule is a common law principle (codified in Kenya and recognized in South Africa) which states that interest stops running once the unpaid interest equals the outstanding principal. It is meant to protect borrowers from becoming eternal debt slaves.

In Kenya, this rule is codified in Section 44A of the Banking Act. However, banks frequently attempt to circumvent it by capitalizing interest or categorizing charges as “expenses” rather than interest.

• Francis Luseno Ashono v AFC: The petitioner argues that the AFC, by virtue of its specific Act, acts as if it is exempt from Section 44A. His debt ballooned to KSh 3.55 million despite substantial repayments. He seeks a court declaration that in duplum applies to all lenders, including statutory ones, to prevent “exploitation”.¹⁰
• Impact on SMEs: The strict application of interest often kills the business before it can recover. In the Ghanaian context, interest rates of 33.16% per annum ¹⁹ mean that a single bad harvest can double the debt burden within three years.

3.2 The Collateral Trap and The “Clean Hands” Doctrine

Commercial banks rely heavily on collateral, often requiring security values that far exceed the loan amount. When borrowers sue to stop foreclosure, banks frequently deploy the “clean hands” doctrine—arguing that a debtor who has not paid cannot seek equitable relief (injunctions) from the court.

• Kioko v Agricultural Finance Corporation (Kenya) ²⁰: The borrower sought an injunction to stop the auction of her property. The court dismissed the application, citing her failure to honor a previous consent order. The judge ruled that she did not come to equity with “clean hands,” effectively prioritizing the bank’s statutory right of sale over her plea of hardship.
• Jonker v Land Bank (South Africa) ²¹: The farmer attempted to stop the liquidation of his Close Corporation by arguing the bank lacked locus standi (legal standing). The court dismissed this technical defense, focusing on the fact of the debt. The judgment reinforces that courts are increasingly impatient with technical defenses raised by debtors to delay foreclosure.

4. The Foreclosure Industry: Auctions, Receiverships, and Asset Stripping

When financing fails, the mechanism of recovery—foreclosure—often raises profound questions of fairness. The process is frequently characterized by undervaluation, insider dealing, and the destruction of the agricultural enterprise as a going concern.

4.1 The “Insider” Auction: Credit Bank vs. Erdemann (Kenya)

A particularly egregious example of potential malpractice in the auction process is the case of Credit Bank in Kenya. The bank sought to sell a property belonging to Erdemann Property Ltd to recover a debt that had ballooned to KSh 817 million. After “failed” attempts to sell the property to third parties, the bank sold the property to itself for KSh 1.125 billion.²²

The borrower challenged this, presenting a valuation of KSh 2 billion and arguing that the bank deliberately scared off other bidders to acquire the prime asset at a discount. The Court of Appeal intervened, freezing the transfer and noting “glaring information gaps” regarding the auction process. This case highlights a critical risk: banks incentivized to engineer a “failed auction” to acquire valuable land assets cheaply, effectively transitioning from lenders to landlords at the expense of the borrower’s equity.

4.2 Receivership as Enterprise Destruction: The Karuturi Saga

The receivership of Karuturi Limited by Stanbic Bank demonstrates how the recovery process can destroy the underlying business.

• Cost Escalation: During the receivership period, the debt owed to Stanbic increased from Sh383 million to over Sh1.8 billion. This increase was driven not just by interest, but by the massive fees paid to the receiver managers and security firms.²³
• Asset Stripping: The owners of Karuturi accused the receivers of demolishing a lakeside lodge (Masdam House) worth $3 million and looting artifacts, significantly devaluing the property.²³
• Piecemeal Sale: Ultimately, the courts allowed the bank to sell the farm’s assets piecemeal rather than as a going concern.⁵ This decision maximized the bank’s immediate recovery but destroyed the integrity of the flower farm, leading to job losses for thousands of workers and the end of a major export engine.

4.3 The Regulatory Shift: Banks Empowered

Recent legal developments in Kenya have further tipped the scales in favor of banks. A High Court ruling by Justice John Chigiti declared that the Auctioneers Licensing Board has no disciplinary power over banks that conduct auctions.²⁵ This ruling removes a layer of oversight, allowing banks to use internal teams to dispose of assets without fear of regulatory sanction from the professional auctioneering body. This deregulation increases the risk of opaque auctions and undervaluation.

4.4 Land Grabs Disguised as Foreclosure: Tanzania

In Tanzania, foreclosure has been the final act in what critics describe as “land grabs.” The collapse of Kilombero Plantation Ltd (KPL) serves as a paradigmatic case.

• The Model: KPL was funded by Norfund, OPIC, and NMB Bank to develop a massive rice plantation using a “System of Rice Intensification” with smallholder out-growers.⁶
• The Failure: The project saddled local farmers with debt for inputs (fertilizer from Yara) they could not afford when rice prices failed to meet projections.
• The Seizure: When KPL defaulted on its $20 million loan to OPIC and $5.6 million to NMB, the bank seized the farm. NMB spent two years trying to sell it before the government intervened.⁶
• The Consequence: The local villagers, who had ceded land for the project, were left landless. The “foreclosure” was essentially the transfer of indigenous land to a financial entity and subsequently to the state/military management, permanently alienating the community from their resource base.²⁶

Table 2: Key Court Rulings on Foreclosure and Fairness

Case	Jurisdiction	Issue	Outcome	Implication for “Fairness”
Shabangu v Land Bank 27	South Africa (Constitutional Court)	Can a suretyship exist if the main loan was invalid?	NO. Suretyship falls away.	Victory for Borrower. Prevents banks from enforcing invalid debts via backdoors.
Van Louw v Land Bank 28	South Africa (High Court)	Surety liability when Bank interferes/mismanages farm.	YES. Surety remains liable.	Victory for Bank. Bank mismanagement of a distressed farm does not absolve the owner.
Kioko v AFC 20	Kenya (High Court)	Injunction to stop auction after default on restructure.	Denied. “Unclean hands.”	Victory for Bank. Breach of restructure agreements is fatal to equitable relief.
Karuturi v Stanbic 24	Kenya (Supreme Court)	Stopping piecemeal sale of farm assets.	Denied. Sale allowed.	Victory for Bank. Creditor’s right to recover liquidity trumps preservation of enterprise.
Credit Bank v Erdemann 22	Kenya (Court of Appeal)	Bank buying the property itself at auction.	Frozen. Sale halted pending investigation.	Victory for Borrower. Courts suspicious of insider sales and undervaluation.

5. Country-Specific Deep Dives

5.1 South Africa: The Erosion of Transformation via Finance

The failure of the Land Bank to support beneficiaries of land reform is a critical failure of post-apartheid justice. The courts, bound by the Public Finance Management Act and contract law, have generally sided with the Bank’s need to recover funds to satisfy its own creditors. The Minister of Rural Development v Land Bank ¹⁶ judgment crystallizes this: the state’s own development bank will cannibalize the state’s own land reform grants to balance its books. This creates a scenario where the government gives land with one hand (via grants) and the government’s bank takes it back with the other (via foreclosure).

5.2 Nigeria: The Criminalization of Agricultural Debt

In Nigeria, the discourse around agricultural finance failure has veered toward criminalization. Unlike other jurisdictions where default is a civil matter, the Nigerian House of Representatives and banks employ the threat of arrest. The Bank of Agriculture officials have openly stated they use “guarantors and other measures to arrest” debtors.¹¹ This coercive environment is exacerbated by the corruption within the system itself (e.g., the Adamawa diversion scandal ¹⁴), making the moral high ground claimed by the lenders tenuous at best.

5.3 Ghana: Judgment Debts and the Poultry Collapse

In Ghana, the failure is often systemic at the state level. The government’s cancellation of contracts has led to massive judgment debts (e.g., GH¢642 million paid out) ²⁹, draining the fiscus of funds that could support agriculture. The Wontumi Farms case, where directors face prosecution for a GH¢24 million loan default from the EXIM Bank ³⁰, indicates a move towards treating large-scale agricultural default as fraud (“causing financial loss to the state”) rather than business failure. This raises the stakes for borrowers significantly.

5.4 Uganda: The Fall of Agro-Logistics Empires

In Uganda, the auctioning of the Aponye empire’s assets (valued at UGX 15 billion) by a consortium of banks (Standard Chartered, UDB) highlights the vulnerability of even large, politically connected enterprises.³² Despite holding lucrative government contracts, the mismatch between cash flow and debt service led to foreclosure. The Uganda Development Bank (UDB) is increasingly becoming the holder of distressed agricultural assets, mirroring the Land Bank in South Africa, as it absorbs the portfolios of failed commercial loans.³³

6. Fairness Analysis: Ethical and Economic Perspectives

To answer the user’s question—”Is this fair?”—one must look beyond the legality of the contracts to the equity of the ecosystem.

6.1 Arguments for Unfairness (Systemic Inequity)

• Predatory Delay: The evidence of banks delaying disbursement (Karuturi, Ghana Broilers) constitutes a breach of the implied duty of good faith. By funding a farming operation too late, the bank ensures the failure that justifies foreclosure. This is not just negligence; it is structural predation.
• Asymmetry of Expertise: Smallholder farmers lack the legal sophistication to navigate complex loan agreements containing “waiver of rights” clauses or to challenge compound interest calculations.
• Asset Stripping: The practice of banks buying assets themselves (Credit Bank) or selling piecemeal (Stanbic) destroys the value built by the farmer, transferring wealth from the producer to the financier at a discount.

6.2 Arguments for Fairness (Lender’s Defense)

• Depositor Protection: Banks like Agribank Namibia argue correctly that they lend depositors’ money. “Failure to recover loans means the Bank will not be able to extend loans to more customers in future”.³⁴ Foreclosure is an existential necessity for the financial system to function.
• Borrower Moral Hazard: The prevalence of loan diversion (Nigeria’s “national cake” mentality), fraudulent titles (Kenya’s AFC scandal), and willful default suggests that many borrowers enter agreements in bad faith.
• Regulatory Mandates: Central Banks strictly regulate NPL ratios. Banks are legally mandated to recover bad debts to maintain capital adequacy. They cannot offer “mercy” without violating banking laws.³⁵

7. Conclusion

The landscape of agricultural financing in Africa is defined by a tragic paradox: the continent possesses 65% of the world’s uncultivated arable land ³⁶, yet its farmers are systematically starved of the capital required to cultivate it effectively.

The failure is not merely one of “bad weather” or “bad farmers.” It is an institutional failure where:

1. State Banks are hollowed out by corruption and political patronage, rendering them incapable of fulfilling their developmental mandate.
2. Commercial Banks apply urban lending logic to rural biological cycles, resulting in mismatched products (partial/delayed funding) that trigger default.
3. The Foreclosure Industry operates with an incentive to undervalue and seize assets, transferring land from productive use to financial balance sheets.

Is it fair? The weight of evidence suggests it is structurally inequitable. When a bank delays funding by three months, causing a crop failure, and then auctions the farm to recover the loan that arrived too late, the system has failed basic principles of natural justice. Until the financial architecture is reformed to align capital flow with crop cycles, criminalize predatory delays by lenders, and de-risk the borrower through effective insurance, the “auction hammer” will remain the dominant sound in African agriculture, signaling not the transfer of assets, but the destruction of potential.

Recommendations for Reform

• Legislation: Enforce in duplum rules across all statutory lenders to prevent debt spirals.
• Contract Law: Introduce “Biological Force Majeure” clauses and penalties for lenders who delay disbursement past critical planting windows.
• Judicial Oversight: Courts should mandate independent valuations and bar “self-purchase” by banks at auctions to prevent predatory asset acquisition.
• Accountability: Prosecute bank officials for “diversion of funds” (as seen in Nigeria) with the same vigor used against defaulting farmers.

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